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THE PLOTINIAN REDUCTION OF ARISTOTLE *S CATEGORIES
By
Christos C. Evangeliou
Towson State University
I
In Ennead VI. 3., Plotinus proposed a fivefold set of
categories which, he thought, can sufficiently account for the
sensible world, unlike the tenfold Aristotelian set which he
sharply criticized, especially in VI. 1., as ontologically
inadequate and logically redundant.1
He found it necessary to
criticize the Aristotelians in this way because, inter alia, "In
their classification they are not speaking about the intelligible
beings."2 In view of the fundamental (for the pure Platonists)
distinction between the intelligible and the sensible worlds,
Plotinus’ charge means that Aristotle erred in directing his
inquiries towards the latter to the neglect of the former which,
nevertheless, comprises "the most important beings."3
Since
Aristotle’s categories fail to function as "genera of Being,"4 in
Plotinus’ view, they lose to Plato’s megista gene as presented in
Sophist 254a-256e and elaborated in Ennead VI. 2.5
Had Plotinus written the treatises of VI. 1. and VI. 2., but
not VI. 3.,6 he would have perhaps proven himself a faithful
follower of Plato and a capable defender of Platonism.7 He would
have perhaps shown why the Aristotelian (and the Stoic for that
matter) set of categories are inapplicable to the intelligible
realm of real Being, as the Platonists understood it.
But he
would have left a gap in his philosophical system by not
providing a catégorial account for the sensible world, especially
because he was not prepared to accept the same set of categories
for the realm of real Being and the realm of mere becoming.8
By proposing a new set of categories for the sensible world,
Plotinus decided to go beyond Plato and challenge Aristotle and
the Stoics in their field of expertise, this sensible world.9
With regard to Aristotle’s categories, his central claim is that,
even when restricted to this field, it is in need of a drastic
reduction and Platonic modification, as we will see presently.10
Thus the proposed Plotinian set numerically corresponds to
Plato’s five megista gene, though in terminology it clearly
resembles Aristotle’s set of categories, reduced and modified.
Given the significance of Aristotle’s doctrine of categories
in shaping our philosophical tradition and its relevance in
contemporary methodological debates,11 the arguments of Plotinus
in rejecting or replacing certain Aristotelián categories cannot
fail to be of interest to us. For the most part, the Plotinian
arguments are philosophically challenging, though occasionally
complex and difficult to follow.12
There is no doubt, however,
that Plotinus was seriously concerned with the problem of
determining the number and
explaining the
nature of the
categories of becoming as opposed to the genera of Being.13
In order to be able to follow Plotinus’ strategy with some
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understanding, it will be helpful to keep in mind the following
facts and important distinctions:
(1) That in VI. 3., Plotinus
searches for a new set of categories of becoming and not for
genera of Being which he had discussed and determined in VI. 2.;
(2) that for Plotinus the term genos as opposed to the term
katêgoria, as well as the term ousia as opposed to the term
genesis, are reserved for the intelligible realm of real Being as
opposed to the sensible realm of mere becoming;14 (3) that the
two realms are related to each other as archetype to its image;15
and (4) that, as a result of this ontological relation, the
danger of homonymy is permanently present in any attempt to think
and to speak logically about the entities and the activities of
each of these two, ontologically distinct, domains.16
In this context,
I propose to consider the Plotinian
reduction of Aristotle’s categories, especially as presented in
the problematic VI. 3. 3.
The following questions will be
discussed:
Which of the Aristotelian categories did Plotinus
consider dispensable and for what specific reasons?
Are there
any non-Aristotelian categories in the Plotinian set and, if so,
where do they come from and how do they function?
By what
method, if any, did Plotinus determine the number of his set of
categories and why just five? Finally, why is it that Plotinus
is the last, in a long series of Platonists, to sharply criticize
Aristotle’s doctrine of categories?
For it is known that his
followers and admirers became increasingly interested in (and
commented favorably on) Aristotle’s categories.
With this in
mind, we may now turn to the relevant texts for enlightenment.
II
According to Porphyry’s division and thematic arrangement of
the Enneads, the treatise of VI. 3. comprises twenty-eight
chapters of which the first three are devoted to preliminary
investigations leading to the specification of the definite
number of categories of becoming, while the remaining chapters
are proportionally allocated to the discussion of each category
in accordance with their relative merit. Of the introductory
chapters, the most important for our purposes is the third
chapter, that is, VI. 3. 3. It is here that Plotinus attempts to
answer certain fundamental aporiai. which were raised in the two
previous chapters, and to provide us with some clues about the
method by which he arrived at his fivefold catégorial list.17
For example, Plotinus states that, having completed the
investigation of kosmos noêtos in the treatise VI. 2. and having
ascertained the need for new "genera" or, rather, categories for
kosmos aistheTtos, he will turn his attention to the realm of
genesis which, unlike the realm of ousia, is something syntheton
because it is composed of matter and form.18 But he insists that
the search for categories of the sensible realm should leave out
of consideration the formal aspect of this realm as an alien
element: "Just as if someone wishing to classify the citizens of
a city, by their property assessments or skills for instance,
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left the resident foreigners out of account" (VI. 3. 1. 26-28).
Next, Plotinus explains that he will use the term ousia to
refer to the sensible "so-called substance."19 For Plotinus any
sensible substance is only homonymously called ousia and it would
be preferable, he suggests, if we could follow the author of the
Timaeus (27Dff) and call it instead genesis (VI. 3. 2. 1-5).
Since this sensible so-called substance can be divided into
bodies and their incidentals or consequences,20 Plotinus sees two
distinct approaches to the problem of devising an adequate
catégorial scheme, the analytical and the analogical approach.
According to Plotinus, philosophical analysis shows that
sensible objects are composed of matter (hylë) and form (eidos).
However, he immediately proceeds to raise the following questions
in a clearly Aristotelian manner:
But what is the common factor of matter and form? For what
essential differentiation is there belonging to matter? But
in what genus is the product of both to be ranked? If the
product of both is itself bodily substance, and each of them
is not a body, how could they be ranked in one and the same
genus with the composite? (VI. 3. 2, 10-14)
As for
the analogicalapproach, Plotinus considers it
briefly buthe rejects it
on the ground that the differences
between the intelligible and the sensible realms are much greater
than any similarities to warrant reliable results. For instance,
itis possible to consider
the matter and form of sensible
objects as playing here below the roles which ousia and kinesis
respectively and authentically play in the intelligible world.
But this analogy would not work to Plotinus* satisfaction:
Now, first of all, matter does not hold or grasp form as its
life and activity, but form comes upon it from elsewhere and
is notone of
matter’s
possessions.
Then, in the
intelligible the form is activity and motion, but here below
motion is something else and an incident: but form is rather
matter’s rest and a kind of quietness for it limits matter
which is unlimited.
(VI. 3. 2, 22-27)21
Having thus

found both

approaches, the

analytical and the

analogical, unsatisfactory, Plotinus tries a new

approach in VI.

3. 3, as follows :
But let us explain how we should divide: this is the way to
begin with; it is one thing to be matter, another to be
form, another to be the composite of both, and another to be
the peripheral characteristics:22 and of these peripheral
characteristics, some are only predicated, some are also
incidental: and of the incidentals some are in those three,
[matter, form, and composite], but in other cases these
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three are in the incidentals; others are their activities,
others their passive affections, and others consequences.
And matter is common and in all the substances, but is
certainly not
a genus,
because it has no essential
differences, unless one understood the differences as one
part having a fiery shape and one the shape of air. But if
one was satisfied with what is common, that there is matter
in all existing things, or that it is like a whole in
relation to parts, it would be a genus in another sense: and
this would be one element, and an element can be a genus.
But the form, with the addition "about matter" or "in
matter," separates from the other forms, but does not
include all substantial form. But if we mean by form that
which makes substance, and by rational formative principle
that which is substantial according to the form, we have not
yet said how substance is to be understood. But as for that
composed of both [matter and form] if this alone is
substance, matter and form are not substances: but if they
are also this, we must investigate what they have in
common.23 But the characteristics which are only predicated
would come under relation, being a cause or being an element
for instance.
And the incidental characteristics in the
three would be quantitative or qualitative, in so far as
they are in them; as for the cases where the three are in
the incidentals, this would be like place and time;24 their
activities and passive affections would be like movements;
their consequences like place and time,
the place a
consequence of the composites, the time of the movement.
But the three will go into one, if we can find something
common, the ambiguous .substance here below: then the others
will follow in order, relation, quantity, quality, in place,
in time, movement, place, time. Or, if one leaves out place
and time, "in place" and "in time" are superfluous, so that
there aré five,25 on the assumption that the first three are
one: but if the first three do not go into one, there will
be matter, form, composite, relation, quantity, quality,
movement. Or these last also could go into relation: for it
is more inclusive.
(VI. 3. 3. 1-31)26
Regarding the correct interpretation of .this admittedly
difficult passage, two general observations would seem to be in
order before we come to consider specific points of interest.
First, it is evident that Plotinus had to take the sensible socalled substance as the starting point for his theorizing about
the categories of becoming, in spite of all the reservations
which he had expressed in the previous chapters.
Second, his
analysis of the sensible so-called substance is twofold:
(1) In
terms of matter, form, and the composite; (2) in terms of its
"peripheral characteristics,"
as
Armstrong periphrastically
renders the cryptic expression of the text, peri tauta.27
It should be noted here that the peri tauta are first
identified by Plotinus in general (and not always Aristotelian)
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terms such as katêgoroumena (predicables), symbebekota (accidents
or
accidentals),
energëmata
(activities), parakolouthemata
(consequences), paths (passions or affections); then, they are
assigned more specific names which are taken from Aristotle’s
catégorial nomenclature, as the attached Tables A and B indicate.
Ill
A comparative examination of the tentative Plotinian lists
of categories, especially the fivefold list which was finally
adopted, with the traditional Aristotelian tenfold list yields
some very interesting results. To begin with, perhaps the most
striking difference between the two lists is their respective
lengths. The Aristotelian list has twice as many members as the
Plotinian list.
Clearly Plotinus thought of half of Aristotle’s
categories as unnecessary, redundant and reducible.
What his
reasons for such a drastic reduction were is a question which
must be
carefully considered
but it
cannot be answered
satisfactorily before we have (1) identified those Aristotelian
categories which were left out of the Plotinian list and (2) have
seen how they functioned within the Aristotelian catégorial
scheme. We will consider these points presently, but first
something should be said about Plotinus* preference for five as
the correct number of categories for the realm of becoming.
In this connection, it may be well to recall that at the
beginning of the treatise, which is characteristically entitled
On the Genera of Being. Plotinus had briefly discussed the
various rival theories of his predecessors regarding the number
of the kinds of onta. that is, one being or many beings either
infinite or finite in number.28 Without much argument Plotinus
rejected both extreme positions, the Parmenidean absolute unity
of being and the Democritian infinite multiplicity of beings.29
Showing awareness of later developments in Hellenic philosophy
regarding the correct solution to this problem, Plotinus asserted
that the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and the Platonists all agreed
on a finite number of "well defined genera."30
But they
disagreed on the specific number of these "genera" or categories,
since they had proposed four, ten, and five, respectively.31 In
this light, Plotinus appears as if he sought to uphold a Platonic
tradition by opting for a fivefold scheme of categories of
becoming in correspondence to the five genera of Being.32
However, as we will see in the next section, be had other and
more philosophical reasons for drastically reducing the number of
Aristotle’s categories.33
A second characteristic of Plotinus’ catégorial analysis is
that he devotes much space to the discussion of matter and form
as
prospective
categories
of becoming distinct from the
composite. In three of his tentative lists, matter and form are
listed separately as if they were different from the category of
the so-called substance. The reason for this uncertainty about
the components of sensible substance is that the term ousia had
been used by Aristotle to apply to the composite as well as to
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matter and form. Yet it is not clear to Plotinus what all these
entities have in common to render such application ontologically
legitimate.34 He asks poignantly:
What is it, then, which is the same in the three, and what
will it be which makes them substance, the. substance in
things here below?
Is it a kind of base for everything
else? But matter is thought to be a base and "seat" for
form, so that form will not be included in substance. And
the composite is a base and seat for other things, so that
the form with the matter will be a base for the composites,
or at least for all that come after the composites,
quantity, quality, movement for instance.
(VI. 3. 4. 1-7)
Plotinus’ questioning
pinpoints the dilemma which any
analysis of the sensible substance along Aristotelian lines must
face.
For if matter and form, as components of sensible
substance, were themselves substances, it would appear that the
composite itself becomes a collection of substances. So it would
not be one substance but many. On the other hand, if matter and
form were not themselves substances, it would follow that
sensible substances derive their substantiality from that which
lacked it.
In either case one is led to logical absurdities.35
In an effort to overcome such difficulties, Plotinus toyed with
the idea of positing form and matter as distinct categories.36
A third characteristic of the Plotinian catégorial scheme is
that it comprises other Aristotelian categories, besides ousia.
These are the three cardinal categories of poson (quantity),
poion (quality), and pros ti (relation, relatives).37 To be sure
the names are the same but the functions .of these categories are
not always Aristotelian. For one thing, they seem to have been
strongly colored by Stoic influence, especially in the case of
quality.38
Then, as a matter of fact, Plotinus does have
numerous objections to Aristotle’s divisions and stipulative
characteristics of each of these categories.39
Furthermore,
Plotinus tends to cross over the boundaries of each category as
defined by Aristotle in the Categories.
For instance, Plotinus treats quantity and quality as the
only symbebekota which are said to be "in" the sensible socalled substance40 which, consequently, he defines as symphoresis
hylës and poioteton, that is, "a coming together of matter and
qualities."41 It is clear that in this definition the category
of poion has absorbed that of poson♦ Besides, quality seems to
have taken the place of the sensible form or eidos itself so that
the composite is considered not as a tode ti (a this) in the
Aristotelian nomenclature, but as a poion ti (a qualified
something).42 In other words, he seems to question seriously the
substantiality of Aristotle’s primary substances. Consider:
And the rational form [logos] of man is the being of
’something’ but its product in the nature of body, being an
image of the form, is rather a sort of ’something like.’43
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It is as if, the visible Socrates being a man, his painted
picture, being colours and painter’s stuff, was called
Socrates: in the same way, therefore, since there is a
rational form according
to
which
Socrates
is, the
perceptible Socrates should not rightly be said to be
Socrates, but colours and shapes which are representations
of those in the form: and this rational form in relation to
the truest form of man is affected in the same way.
And so
much for that.
(VI. 3. 15. 29-38)
The modern reader would prefer that Plotinus had said much
more in clarifying the point which he tries to make in this
difficult passage.
Apparently he wants to distinguish between
the logos of man and the logos of an individual human being, e.g.
Socrates.
But what the meaning of logos is, in the latter case,
is not clear. If logos be interpreted as having the same meaning
in both cases, it would seem to follow that Plotinus thought of
individual substances as being definable, which is contrary to
Aristotle’s position.44
Such an interpretation may lead to the
further
suggestion
that
Plotinus
postulated
"Forms" of
individuals, as has been argued by some scholars.45
It is possible, however, that logos in the case of Socrates
does not stand for definition but for description.46
In this
case, the logos of man will give the ti esti (the-what-is-it) of
the definiendum. while the logos of Socrates will qualify the td
by the addition of a collection of poiotêtes in such a way that
the whole product will become a poion ti. If this is a correct
interpretation, then the meaning of the above-quoted passage can
be captured by an analogy and rendered thus:
As the picture of
Socrates stands to living Socrates so the logos (description) of
Socrates stands to logos (definition) of man. The implication is
that for Plotinus, unlike Aristotle, ontological priority must be
given to the generic as opposed to the particular.
On this,
then, Plotinus is certainly closer to Plato than Aristotle was,
at least when he wrote the Categories.47
Be this as it may, the important point for our purposes is
that the categories of quantity and quality, which are prominent
in Aristotle’s list, have been reduced to relation in at least
one of Plotinus’ tentative lists.
So is every other category
except for ousia.
Although Plotinus did not in the end adopt
this twofold division, it is significant that he even suggested
it because it serves as an indication of his tendency to raise
the category of relation to its old Platonic status.48 Given its
expansion and elevation to the second place, after ousia, in all
the tentative lists of Plotinus, it comes as a surprise that this
category is not discussed at any length in VI. 3.49 There is no
need for us here to follow the details of Plotinus’ different
treatment of the Aristotelian category of pros ti. since our
purpose is to consider which of Aristotle’s categories Plotinus
deemed reducible and for what reasons.50
To this question our
attention should be turned next.
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IV
From Table B it is evident that six Aristotelian categories
are missing from the fivefold list which Plotinus adopted. They
are: pou. pote, poiein. paschein. echein. and keisthai.51 Their
omission is justified on the grounds that they are unnecessary
either because they are reducible to other more fundamental
categories or because they are replacible by other newly issued
categories.
It should be noted here, that even Aristotle had
treated these categories only summarily in the Categories where
lengthy discussions were devoted to the cardinal categories of
ousia, poson. poion, and pros ti. In the very short chapter nine
of the Categories, Aristotle (1) asserts that, the categories of
poiein and paschein admit of contraries and degrees;
(2) states
that the category of keisthai relates to that of pros ti by means
of paronymy only; and (3) concludes his discussion by saying that
the meanings of the remaining categories of pote. pou, and echein
are so apparent that "I need say no more than I said at the very
beginning."
Then he repeats the examples which he had used
earlier to illustrate the meaning of each of these categories.52
Leaving aside the question of why Aristotle treated these
categories in such a summary way, we will concentrate on the
reasons for which Plotinus excluded them from his proposed set.
If we take them by pairs and start with the weakest of them all,
then we will consider first the pair of keisthai and echein♦ It
is the case that these two categories are absent from all
enumerations of categories to be found dispersed throughout the
Aristotelian corpus with the notable exceptions of Categories lb
25-28 and Topics 103b 20-24.
Our first observation is that Plotinus does not refer to
this fact in his criticism of these two categories. Nor does he
pay any attention to the fact that Aristotle did not elaborate on
these categories even when he mentioned them and even where such
a discussion would be appropriate, in the Categories. Treating
them as legitimate Aristotelian categories, he argues rigorously
against their catégorial status (VI. 1. 23. 1-24).
Evidently having in mind the polysemy of echein as discussed
by Aristotle in Categories 15b 18-25, Plotinus first asks to
paraphrase him:
Why is it that having shoes or arms on should
make up a separate category, while having color, magnitude, a
wife, a son, etc. does not? Then, anticipating the probable
Peripatetic response that "the mode of having" is different in
each of these cases, Plotinus is prepared to make a concession
only in order to strike back by asking (not without irony): If
"the mode of having," in having shoes on, is sufficient reason
for accepting a separate category, what about taking them off or
burning them?
Should we postulate another category to account
for cases like these?
Furthermore, restricting his consideration to the expression
of "having on," Plotinus is able to argue along these lines: If
it is the "on" which makes necessary the postulation of another
category to account for such facts as "having shoes on," then
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certainly more categories will be needed to cover cases like
"having a table-cloth on" or "having a bed-spread over," since
the mode of having differs depending on whether we talk about
men, tables or beds.
On the other hand, if the emphasis is not
on the "on" but on "having," then why not, Plotinus wonders,
place these cases of having where Aristotle had placed all
hexeis? 53
Finally, and more importantly for Plotinus' critique, in
considering the category of echein and, as we will see, the
category of keisthai. Aristotle gives the impression that he has
forgotten what he had stated at the beginning of his treatise,
that is, that the categories were supposed to be about hapla
(simple) and aneu symplokês legomena (uncombined expressions)
such as "man," "horse," "runs," "wins" and the like.54
But how
is it possible, Plotinus argues, to consider as a simple entity,
falling under the heading of one category, something as complex
as "that-man-over-there-has-shoes-on?"
In instances like this,
Plotinus correctly sees two separate beings, a man and his shoes,
related in a certain way. But, since the cardinal categories of
ousia and pros ti had already been established by Aristotle, the
introduction of echein as a new and separate category was a
puzzle to Plotinus as it has been to many modern philosophers.55
It might have puzzled Aristotle too, which would explain why he
gradually dropped from his catégorial set
echein and keisthai·
Regarding the category of keisthai. Plotinus has numerous
objections which are similar to those which he advanced against
echein (VI. 1. 24. 1-12). First, he observes that the examples
"sitting," "reclining" and the like, are not cases of keisthai
simpliciter but of being positioned "in a certain way" (pos).
For they indicate respectively that "something occupies a certain
place in a certain way" and that "something is situated in such
and such a way" (keitai en toiode schemati).
Now, since for
Aristotle (1) schemata (figures) are considered as one kind of
quality (Categories 9b 11-24); (2) topos (place) is considered as
one kind
of quantity (Categories 4b 20-33); and (3) the
categories of quantity and quality have been well-established,
Plotinus sees no real need for the category of keisthai which
could be reduced to them.
Secondly, Plotinus argues that, if expressions like "is
seated" or "sits" (kathetai) indicate activity or passivity,56 in
either case they can be accounted for by the categories of poiein
and paschein. both of which are related and, in his view,
ultimately reducible to kinesis. as we will see. If so, there is
no need for the Aristotelian category of keisthai. since ousia.
pros ti. poiein and paschein can very well perform the task which
this strange category was supposed to fulfill. The same holds
true for the next pair of categories, pote and pou which, in
Plotinus’ view, can be reduced to chronos and topos respectively
both of which Aristotle had classified as continuous quantities.
With regard to pote (time in which, when), under which fall
such expressions as "yesterday," "last year," "tomorrow" and the
like, Plotinus makes the following observations.
If these
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expressions denote "parts of time," then they obviously belong to
the same category as time and, therefore, they should be placed
under quantity
where Aristotle himself had placed chronos
(Categories 4b 23-26).57 In the case that these expressions do
not indicate just time but "time-when," Plotinus is prepared to
argue that, in so far as "time-when" relates to time, we must
account for it categorially in terms of time. However, in so far
as "time-when" is considered as being a combination of two
distinct entities, that is, time and that which is an activity in
time or a durational event, then clearly we have not one but two
categories which means that Aristotle’s criterion of catégorial
simplicity is violated.
Even if pote is construed as meaning
"being-in-time," Aristotle would seem to run into all sorts Of
difficulties involved or implied by the multivocity of this "in":
Why will not what is in a pot make another category, and why
is not what is in matter something else, and what is in a
substance something else, and the part in the whole, and the
whole in the parts, and the genus in the species, and the
species in the genus?
And we shall have more categories.
(VI. 1. 14. 20-24)
The last criticism evidently applies equally to the category
of pou (place-in-which, somewhere). Since Plotinus’ questioning
of pou parallels that of pote. we can afford to be brief here.
His arguments are to the effect that expressions such as "in the
Lyceum," "in Athens," "above," "below," and the like seem (1) to
involve more than one category; (2) to be reducible to topos and
ultimately to the Aristotelian category of quantity; and (3) to
indicate a certain relation (schesis) "of this in that," and so
they can be accounted for by the Plotinian category of pros ti.
In any case, there is no real need for a new category of pou.
Turning next to the last pair of questionable Aristotelian
categories, poiein (action, acting) and paschein (being acted
upon, passion), we may note that they are treated somewhat
differently than the other two pairs.
In Plotinus* view these
two categories are related to kinesis (motion, movement).58
The
fact that Plotinus devoted many chapters to the discussion of
this category is indicative of the importance of kinesis as a
category of becoming in his set.59
The same fact makes it
difficult for us to provide a detailed exposition here of
Plotinus* many arguments in support of this non-Aristotelian
category which he thought was needed. It will suffice to point
out only some of the arguments which Plotinus adduced to justify
the replacement of the Aristotelian categories of poiein and
paschein by the Platonic genus of kinesis. To better understand
the disagreement of Plotinus and Aristotle on this important
point it will be necessary to briefly recall how the Stagirite
conceived of kinesis and why he excluded it from his categories.
The third Book of Physics is perhaps the best place in the
Aristotelian corpus to look for enlightenment on this matter.
There physis is defined as "the principle of movement and change"
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(200b 12-13).
One kind of pros ti is identified as "that which
is active and that which is acted on, and generally . . . that
which moves (or changes) something as the agent and that which
is moved (or changed) by it as the patient" (200b 30— 34). It is
also asserted that "motion and change cannot exist in themselves
apart from what moves and changes" (200b 32).
Furthermore, "the
indefinite and elusive character of motion" is recognized and
explained by reference to the fact that kinesis is located
between dynamis (potentiality, potency) and energeia (activity,
actuality) (201b 25-28).
Subsequently, kinesis is defined as
"the actualization of the movable qua movable" (202a 8-9).60
With all this Plotinus has no quarrel.
Although he
uses a
variety of related terms such as odos, agoge. and proodos, all of
which carry the meaning of process and passage from one state to
another, his conception of kinesis is basically the same as that
which Aristotle’s definition reveals (VI. 3. 22. 1-44).
Regarding the kinds of kinësis. Aristotle does not always
give the same account.
For instance, in Physics 201a 8-9 he
states that there are as many kinds of kingsis as there are of
being by which he presumably means the ten categories. In the
Categories the enumeration of the kinds of kinesis includes only
the following:
(1) generation and destruction, (2) increase and
decrease, (3) alteration and (4) locomotion (15a 13-14).
These
correspond respectively to the four categories of ousia. poson.
poion. and pou. But in Physics 225a 37-38, Aristotle claims
that, strictly speaking, genesis and phthora are not kinds of
kinesis which are thus restricted to quantitative, qualitative
and local motions. Plotinus seems to be in favor of the sixfold
division as presented in the Categories. To this list he added
poiein and paschein as distinct kinds of kinesis which is, thus,
elevated by him to the status of a category of becoming.
On this last point the two philosophers certainly disagree.
Aristotle never refers to kinesis as a category. For him it is
an intercategorial concept. Like to on (being) and to hen (one),
kinesis cuts across many (if not all) categories. It operates
between contraries
(ta enantia).
presupposes à substratum
(hypokeimenon, or hylê). and tends towards an end (telos).61
Aristotle also maintains that poiein and paschein are
distinct categories, since "acting" and "being acted upon" are
different in definition (to logo), even when one and the same
activity is involved as in the case of cutting.
The road from
Athens to Thebes may be one and the same but the going to and the
coming from Thebes is different.
For
"In these cases we are
dealing with one and same thing which may be regarded or defined
from two different approaches.
So too with the mover and the
moved" (202a 20-22).
Contrary to this, Plotinus claims that
kinesis deserves to be treated as a category, and more so than
such Aristotelian categories as poiein and paschein which can be
considered as its kinds.
This point needs elaboration so that
the difference between the two philosophers will become clear.
According to Plotinus, any candidate for a catégorial
position should meet three specified criteria: irreducibility to
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any other well-established category, predicability of the highest
degree, and capability of yielding species and subspecies by
application of the appropriate differentiae♦
Since kinesis
passes this test, Plotinus thinks that it should be accepted as a
catégorial companion
to so-called
substance together with
quality, quantity, and relation (VI. 3. 21. 1-15).
But, if
kinesis is accepted as a catégorial genus, then both poiein and
paschein, will have to be considered as its species and,
therefore, they will lose their status as separate categories.
The possibility of viewing kinesis as a kind of pros ti and,
thus, reducible to relation on the ground that any motion is
motion of the movable (tinos kinesis), cannot be seriously
considered, according to Plotinus,
because by the same token
everything else would be reduced to relation.
This would make
the catégorial set twofold, substance and relation, but such a
wholesale reduction would, inter alia, run contrary to the
Aristotelian definition of pros ti which Plotinus had accepted
with certain reservations.62
However, the possibility of considering metabole (change)
and energeia (act, actuality) as rivals to kingsis for the
catégorial title is more serious.
We may recall here that
Aristotle
had
characterized
kinesis
as áteles energeia
(uncompleted actuality)
and had
considered genesis not as
kinesis but as a metabole (201b 31-32). Could they not, then, be
placed higher than kinesis
and render null its claim to the
catégorial status?
Plotinus is
well aware of this serious
challenge and prepared to
meet it
head on.In a long and
involved passage (VI. 3. 21. 25-47), he argues to the effect that
either metabolë is synonymous to kinesis or, if their meanings
differ, "change would be rather a species of movement bëing a
movement which takes a thing out of itself" (46-47).63
In Plotinus’ view, Aristotle’s characterization of kinesis
as áteles energeia clearly indicates that energeia is the generic
concept and áteles the specific difference which determines the
nature of kinesis.
But what the epithet áteles mean in this
connection, is not clear to Plotinus. In what sense, he asks, is
kinesis "uncompleted" or "incomplete"?
Consider, for instance,
walking which is a kind of locomotion.
In the walking process
every step qua motion is as actual as any other, first, middle or
last. To talk of incomplete motion can only mean that we tend to
associate walking with the distance to be traversed. Thus, in
terms of actuality both energeia and kinesis stand on the same
level, Plotinus suggests, and the same holds for their relation
to time. For he rejects the claim that kinesis is in time (en
chrono). while energeia is not (achronos).
In a sense, he
insists, neither is "in time" (VI. 1. 16. 14-17).
In the light of the above considerations,
it seems clear
that Plotinus’ arguments are intended to establish the following
theses: (1) that poiein and paschein can be considered as two
distinct kinds of kinesis ; (2) that a kinesis can be either
absolute (apolytos) or directed towards something else, e.g.
walking or singing as opposed to cutting or burning; (3) that in

13
the latter case there is one and the same motion, though to cut
and to be cut, for instance, are not the same as indicated by the
algos (pain) felt; and (4) that as a result of this difference
there is a tendency to consider other-directed motions as
contrary, that is, as active and passive.
Now that this is not the case can be shown by considering
such activities as.(a) writing, for it would be absurd to say
that the paper is suffering the impact of the pen;
(b) hitting,
for it is possible that the agent may suffer as much as the other
fellow if it happen to be the delicate hand of a lady which
struck the blow; and (c) learning through instruction, for the
student (the patient) must be as active as the teacher (the
agent) if the process is to succeed. However, in clear-cut cases
involving action and passion such as healing or burning, Plotinus
thinks that "it is the same motion, but looked at on one side it
will be action, but on the other passive affection" (VI. 1. 22,
11-13). If so, poiein and paschein can be subsumed under the new
category of kinesis which came to rival ousia in terms of
catégorial import in the Plotinian scheme.64
V
To recapitulate, it is evident that Plotinus undertook the
task of providing a new set of categories for the sensible realm
by drastically reducing the Aristotelian tenfold set and by
modifying it in such a way that it became more Platonic. The
need for such reconstruction was perhaps provided by the fact
that Aristotle had not treated all of his categories with equal
care, while Plato had emphasized the importance of kinesis as a
generic concept necessary for any reasoned account of the
sensible and the intelligible realms of being.
Plotinus was able to reduce Aristotle’s categories by half
by arguing that of the omitted six categories (a) pou and pote
are unnecessary as reducible to the category of quantity or even
to the category of relation;
(b) echein and keisthai do not
qualify to be considered as categories because they fail to meet
the criterion of generic simplicity, since they involve items
which fall under different categories, that is* substance and
relation; and (c) poiein and paschein. considered as the two
sides of one and the same coin, can be subsumed under the
Platonic genus of kinesis with any loss.
Plotinus was the last Platonist to criticize Aristotle’s
doctrine of categories before it became a part of the Neoplatonic
synthesis.65
His project of reconstructing the Aristotelian
catégorial scheme by reduction and replacement was daring but
unsuccessful in that it was not accepted even by his close
associates and admirers. For Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Dexippus,
did not follow Plotinus’ lead on this matter.
They initiated a
new policy of non-confrontation and possible reconciliation of
Plato and Aristotle. As a result of this policy the categories
were accepted and defended in toto, that is, without any Platonic
modification or Plotinian reduction.66
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FOOTNOTES
1.
In "The Ontological Basis of Plotinus’ Criticism of
Aristotle’s Categories," in The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic
Approach, R.B. Harris, ed., (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1982),
pp. 73-83, I have provided an account of what I consider to be
the basic reasons for which Plotinus could not accept Aristotle’s
categories.
2.
Enneads VI. 1. 2. 29-30.
The translation is that of
Professor Armstrong who was kind enough to let me use his
completed but unpublished typescript of the sixth Ennead. Unless
stated otherwise, I will follow his translation throughout.
3. This is my rendering of the expression "ta malista onta"
which Armstrong translates as "those which are most authentically
beings."
For Plotinus* detailed criticism of the Aristotelian
and the Stoic sets of categories, see VI. 1., chapters 2-24 and
25-30 respectively.
4. The common title of the three treatises, VI.1., VI. 2.,
and VI. 3., is Peri tön genon tou ontos which clearly indicates
Plotinus’ ontological approach to the catégorial problem.
5. Plotinus also refers to Plato’s genera in II. 4. 5.,
III. 7. 3., and V. 1. 4.
For a concise account of his
interpretation of this doctrine, see E. Brehier’s introduction to
Ennead VI. 2. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1924-1938), pp. 34ff.
6. The division of this treatise and some others (e.g. III.
2. and III. 3., IV. 2., IV. 3. and IV. 5., and VI. 4. and VI. 5.)
was the result of Porphyry’s editorial effort to reach the
desired number 54 ( 6 x 9 ) which gave the title to the Enneads.
7.
As another example of Plotinus’ rigorous defense of
Platonism, see II. 9., and my "Plotinus’ Anti-gnostic Polemic" in
Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, J. Bregman, ed., (forthcoming).
8. "For it is absurd to put being under one genus with nonbeing, as if one were to put Socrates and his portrait under one
genus" (VI. 2. 1. 23-24). For a recent appraisal of the function
of image in Plotinus’ philosophy, see J.H. Fielder, "Chorismos
and Emanation in the Philosophy of Plotinus," in The Significance
of Neoplatonism, R.B. Harris, ed., (Albany, N.Y.:
SUNY Press,
1976), pp. 101-121.
9.
This certainly sets Plotinus apart from such Middle
Platonists as Albinus, Plutarch, and the anonymous commentator
who had found the alleged Platonic categories in Timaeus 35Bff,
in Parmenides 137Cff, and in Theaetetus 152Dff respectively.
On
this see J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1977), especially pp. 226 and 279ff.
10.
The most important modification,
in my view, is the
replacement of the Aristotelian categories of poiein and paschein
by the category of kinesis which should be considered as
Platonic, since it corresponds to one of Plato’s megista gene*.
11.
For the relevant bibliography, I refer to W.K.C.
Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. VI, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983); and J. Barnes et al.. eds.,
Articles in Aristotle, vol. 1, (New York:
St. Martin’s Press,
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1975). For recent discussions, see C. Kahn, "Questions and
Categories," in Questions. H. Hiz, ed., (Holland, Boston: D.
Reidel, 1979), pp. 227-278; A. Edel, Aristotle (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 97-101; J.
Moravcsik, "Aristotle’s Theory of Categories," in Aristotle: A
Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Co., 1967), pp. 125-145; J. Catan, ed., Aristotle: The Collected
Papers of
Joseph Owens (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1981),
especially Chapters One and Two; and my paper "Alternative
Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Categories," in
Language and Reality in Ancient Greek Philosophy, K. Boudouris,
ed., (Athens, Greece: Achtida, 1985), pp. 163-173.
12.
One of the most serious students of Plotinus, W.R.
Igne, has stated that the treatise under consideration is one of
"the most obscure and least interesting." The Philosophy of
Plotinus (New York: Longmans,
1948), p. 194.
Although this
statement is partially correct, it may account for the paucity of
works devoted to this part of the Enneads. In English there are
J.P. Anton’s "Plotinus* Approach to Categorical Theory," in The
Significance of Neoplatonism (Albany, N.Y.:
SUNY Press, 1976),
pp. 83-99; and J.M. Rist’s Plotinus :____ The Road to Reality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1967), especially pp.
103-112.
Rist concludes that "Plotinus’s view [of the sensible
object] is basically the original Platonic position" (p. Ill);
whereas Anton insists that "with Plotinus we have the appearance
of a radically different ontology of the sensible object. If
anything, it is non-Hellenic in character" (p. 97). As for the
Europeans, two important and recently published books should be
mentioned: K. Wurm, Substanz und Qualität (Berlin: Greyter,
1973); and C. Rutten, Les catégories du monde sensible dans les
Enneádes de Plotin (Paris:
Universitaire de Liege, 1961).
Neither of these scholars discuss in any detail the passage under
consideration. Wurm’s main thesis is the contrast between "Der
platonische kategoriale Gegensatz von ousia und poion und die
nicht-platonische Form seiner Vermittlung in Plotin" (p. 257);
whereas Rutten attempts to show that in Plotinus "la connaissance
n ’a point d ’object" by arguing as follows: "C’est donc a defaut
de pouvoir identifier la substance 'S. la fonction de genre remplie
par son concept que Plotin réduit 1’ousia a sa fonction de subjet
logique. Un idéalisme contrarié se change ainsi en nominalisme"
(p. 70, repeated on pages 82, 92, 103, 112-115, etc.).
13.
About one-tenth of the Enneads is devoted to this
topic. Regarding the correctness of Plotinus’ interpretation of
Plato’s genera and the Platonism of Plotinus in general, Anton,
op. cit., has expressed reservations, contrary to J.N. Findlay,
"The Platonism of Plotinus," in the same volume, pp. 23-41. One
of the oddities of interpreting Plato’s megista gene as "genera
of Being" is that "being" (to on) becomes a "genus of Being!"
Hence Plotinus* tendency to substitute ousia for to on in the
Platonic list.
14.
For a detailed discussion of the term "genus" and
"category," see Rutten, op. cit., pp. 42-55.
It is significant
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that Plotinus ends his criticism of each Aristotelian category
with the invariable comment that they cannot function as genera,
let alone the "genera of Being." On this, see note No. 1 above.
15. In reference to the sensible realm, Plotinus throughout
the Enneads employs terms like eikon, eidolon, skia, homoiSma.
all of which connote the notion of image and indicate the
dependence of the sensible on the intelligible kosmos.
To use
Plotinus’ metaphor, it is as if the sensible "hangs upon" the
intelligible (anêrtêtai, VI. 5. 9. 36 and elsewhere).
16. For instance, in VI. 1. 2. 1-3, Plotinus states: "And
first of all we should consider what is called substance,
agreeing that the nature of the sphere of bodies can only be
called substance ambiguously fhomdnymosl, or should not properly
be called substance at all but coming into being, because it is
adapted to the idea of things in flux."
17.
That this passage is problematic has escaped the
attention of both Rutten and Wurm, op. cit.
However, Brêhier»
op. cit., p. 46, wondered whether we have here "un texte de
Plotin ou h quelque maladroite interpolation."
I agree with
Bréhier that this chapter is difficult to interpret, but even he
does not seem to take seriously the suggestion that it may be
interpolated.
18.
E.g. in 410a 1, 412a 16, 1023a 31, 1029b 23, 1051b 19,
Aristotle uses the term "to syntheton" to refer to the concrete
individual substance.
But for the same purpose he uses more
often "to synolon" which denotes a stronger union between matter
and form.
Plotinus’ adoption of the former term stresses the
point that eidos is an alien to (
the world of hylê.
19. The Plotinian expression "ousia legomenê" is rendered
into English variously by different authors:
"pseudo-substance"
(Anton), "ambiguous substance" (Armstrong),
"what passes as
substance" (MacKenna).
I prefer the rendering "so-called
substance" because it captures better the irony of the legomenê.
20. Armstrong’s "incidentals" and "consequences" translate
respectively symbebêkota and parakolouthemata of which the former
is Aristotelian and the latter either Stoic or Epicurean,
according to the apparatus criticus of P. Henry and H. Schwyzer.
Taking into account Porphyry’ testimony, Vita Plotini 14, it
would be more probable for this term to be Stoic than Epicurean.
21. For Plotinus’ views on hylê and its kinds, see II. 4.
22.
The text has peri tauta, literally "those things which
are about these entities [matter and form]," that is, the
symbebêkota which, according to Topics 102b 5-8, may or may not
belong to a given substance.
23.
In VI. 3.8.
1-37, Plotinus critically examines the
characteristics of substance, as found in Categories 5.
24.
Armstrong here translates topos and chronos which are
in all probability
neglegenter pro en topé kai en chrono, as
Henry and Schwyzer have suggested.
25. See the attached Tables A and B.
26.
The last categories which are reducible to relation
are : poson. poion. and kinesis. that is, every category in the
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Plotinian list except for ousia.
27. About this expression, see note No. 22 above.
28.
Of the reasons which Plotinus produces in arguing
against an infinite number of beings, the strongest seems to be
that which echoes Aristotle’s Physics 189a 11-16 and claims that
the hypothesis renders epistemê impossible (VI. 1. 1. 8-9).
29.
This means that, ontologically speaking, Plotinus is
not a monist.
There are many different kinds of onta, though
limited in number. The One qua hypostasis is a different case.
Like the Platonic Good, the Plotinian One is beyond being. See
on this The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval
Philosophy. A.H. Armstrong, ed., (Cambridge: At the University
Press, 1970), especially pp. 236-250.
30. As MacKenna renders the expression "gene horismena."
31. But the dispute is not just about numbers.
Plotinus
claims that there is a fundamental ontological difference between
the Platonic genera and the Aristotelian (and Stoic) categories,
as we said at the beginning.
32.
To what extent this choice determined Plotinus’
strategy in reducing Aristotle’s categories from ten to five is
difficult to tell, since numerical correspondence to the Platonic
genera is not among his reasons for accepting the fivefold set.
33. Six out of ten Aristotelian categories are excluded
from the list of Plotinus.
The accepted categories are: ousia
Γlogomene], poson, poion, and pros ti.
34. In contrast to Plotinus, Porphyry states categorically
that the ousia to which Aristotle’s categories apply is the
composite (synamphoteron). Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. A.
Busse, ed., (Berlin: Reimer, 1887), vol. IV, part 1, p. 88.
35.
Evidently Plotinus attempts to exploit the ambiguities
of Aristotle’s position regarding ousia. as stated in Categories
2a 11-14 and Metaphysics 1031b 6-8, 1037a 27-30, 1037b 33-35.
36. But we should not forget that "The whole amalgam itself
[the sensible so-called substance] is not True Substance; it is
merely an imitation of that True Substance which has Being apart
from its concomitants" (VI. 3. 8. 32-34).
37. It is more correct to render the technical expression
ta pros ti as relatives or correlatives rather than relation.
The former emphasizes the onta which are related, while the
latter stresses their schesis. This case is parallel to homonyma
[i.e. onta or pragmata]. with which the Categories opens. On
this, see H. Apostle, Aristotle’s Categories and Propositions
(Grinnell: The Peripatetic Press, 1980), p. 51-52.
38. See Ennead II. 6., On Quality. For a good account of
the Stoic categories, I refer to A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy
(London: Duckworth, 1974), pp. 160-163; also J. Rist, Stoic
Philosophy (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), pp. 152-172.
39. See, e.g. VI. 1. 2.-24.
40.
The point is that quantity and quality are said to be
"in" the sensible substance which, in its turn, is "in" place and
"in" time.
On the question of their individuation, I refer to
G.E.L. Owen,
"Inherence," Phronesis 10 (1965): 97-105; R.E.
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Allen,
"Individual
Properties
in Aristotle’s Categories,"
Phronesis 14
(1969):
31-39;
and J. Moravcsik,
"Aristotle on
Predication," Philosophical Review (1967): 80-96.
41.
For a detailed analysis of Plotinus’ conception of
sensible substance, see Wurm, op. cit., especially p. 250ff.
42.
But for Aristotle the opposite of this is true. For he
notes,
in reference to species and genera, that by "man" and
"animal" not a
"this" but
"a qualified something is meant"
(Categories 3b
15-17, translation mine).
See also Sophistical
Refutations 178b 38-40, and contrast it to De Anima 412a 6-10.
43.
Armstrong’s translation here is awkward but it seems to
reflect
the
original
text.
An alternative and more liberal
formulation would run as follows: "And the logos of man is its
essential being,
but the bodily existent is rather a qualified
something than a something, since it is an image of logos."
44.
For Aristotle the individual receives the name and the
definition of its species (Categories 2b 21-27).
45.
See the debate between J. Rist, "Forms of Individuals
in Plotinus," Classical
Quarterly, n.s.
13 (1963): 23-31; J.
Blumenthal,
"Did Plotinus Believe in Ideas of Individuals?"
Phronesis ♦ XI No. 1 (1966):
61-81;
and A.H. Armstrong, ^orm,
Individual and Person in Plotinus," Dionysus, 1 (1972): 49-68.
46.
The Greek word is hypographe. It is used frequently by
Porphyry and other commentators on the Categories with reference
to a description of individuals or of the highest genera which
cannot be defined by genus and differentia.
It is also found in
Aristotle, e.g. On Plants 819b 16, and De Interpretatione 22a 22.
47.
If the general consensus which considers the Categories
as an
early treatise
is correct,
then this point acquires some
import,
in view
of
Jaeger’s
position
about Aristotle’s
progressive estrangement from Platonism.
48.
In the Sophist 255c, Plotinus had found the important
distinction of onta between the kath auto and the pros alia.
49.
To the category of pros ti Plotinus devoted four whole
chapters in VI. 1., chapters 6-9.
50.
In VI. 3. capters 1-20, Plotinus states the conditions
under which the Aristotelian categories of ousia, poson, and
poion could be accepted as "genera" of the realm of becoming.
51.
Aristotle’s categories are variously rendered into
Engish by different authors.
See Table & for the most common
renderings.
I have preferred the Greek terms in tranliteration.
52.
Categories
2a 1-5,
in
Cooke’s translation, the
illustrative examples are respectively "in the the market-place"
and "in the Lyceum", "yesterday" and
"last year," "is shod" and
"is armed."
53.
In Categories 8b 27-29, Aristotle classified hexeis as
a kind of p o i o n , while he considered them as a case of pros ti in
10b 20-46.
A.
Edel, op.
cit., p.
100, states:
"If habits or
states (hexeis ) are akin
to the category of state (echein; the
terms are linguistically related), the whole field of virtues and
vices in ethics would be brought within its scope."
But by the
same token
two cardinal
categories, quality and relation, would
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be reducible to the dubious category of echein♦ Such a reduction
would be more drastic than that of Plotinus.
54.
In Categories lb 25, the categories are introduced as
aneu symplokês legomena.
55. These two categories have been aptly characterized by
Kahn, op. cit., as "anthropocentric," since they seem to function
only when the subject of discourse is a man, e.g. Socrates.
56. VI. 1. 23. 4-6.
This Plotinian either/or is a false
dilemma, because in Greek grammar between the active and passive
voices there is the middle voice, to which Aristotle’s examples
refer with regard to the category of keisthai (which, by the way,
examplifies this middle voice).
57. On this point, Aristotle would disagree with Plotinus.
As an Aristotelian category pote does not stand for measurable
time in general, but for determined time during which something
occurs.
Simplicius, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol.
VIII, (Berlin: Reimer, 1907), pp. 301ff.
.58. Kinesis is the only Plotinian category which exactly
corresponds to the homonymous Platonic genus. For recent debates
of this concept, see J. Ackrill, "Aristotle’s Distinction Between
Energeia and Kinesis." in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. R.
Bambrough, ed., (New York: Humanities Press,
1965), pp. 121-141;
R. Polansky,
"Energeia in Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX." Ancient
Philosophy. Ill, No. 2 (1983): 160-171; P.S. Mano, "Energeia and
Kinesis in Metaphysics Theta 6," Apeiron 4 (1970): 24-34; and
L.A. Kosman, "Aristotle’s Definition of Motion," Phronesis 14
(1969): 58-9.
59. VI. 1. 3. 21-27.
60.
The translation of the quotations from the Physics is
that of P.H. Wicksteed and F.M. Cornford (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1970).
61.
See, e.g. Metaphysics 1046a-1048b, Nicomachean Ethics
1174a-1175b, and De Anima 431a-b.
62. In my translation, Aristotle’s definition of pros ti
reads as follows: "Relatives are called those things which, in
order to be what they are, are said to be of something else or
somehow related to something else." In Ackrill’s rendering of the
same passage we read: "We call relatives all such that are said
to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some way
in relation to something else."
63.
The term, which Aristotle uses in 222b 16 with
reference to change and which is echoed here, is ekstatike.
64. According to Simplicius, op. cit., p. 306-308, Plotinus
has been influenced by the Stoics here. Perhaps Aristotle wanted
to keep poiein and paschein as separate categories because some
activities do not imply passivity (i.e. noein) or
reciprocity
(i.e. to kinoun akiniton which he mentions in 201a 24).
65.
For a complete list of commentators and critics of the
Categories, see Simplicius, op. cit., pp 1-2.
66. I discuss this problem thoroughly in my forthcoming
book, Aristotle’s
Categories and Porphyry, which has been
accepted for publication in the series Philosophia Antiqua.
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